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Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56.5 is determinative of the
Court's ability to award attorney's fees and costs to the
appellant if the trial court's judgment is reversed.

It states:

A court may award costs and attorney's fees
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jyfilgpigTIQN
This appeal is from a Judgment entered in the Third
Circuit Court, Salt Lake Department, on October 3, 1990.

The

Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3(2)(d).
ISSUES PRESENTED
a.

Did the trial court err as a matter of law in

holding under the undisputed facts that there was not a failure
or lack of consideration?
b.

Was the trial court' s legal conclusion that the

contract between the parties did not give appellant the right to
reject said contract upon reasonable notice of a defect erroneous
as a matter of law?
c.

Was the trial court' s legal conclusion that there

was no mutual mistake of fact upon which the parties entered into
their contract erroneous as a matter of law?
Standard of Review as to each issue:

The facts as

found by the trial court in this case are not in dispute.

Thus

the issues raised are questions of law and the trial court' s
conclusions of law are accorded no particular deference.
v. BMG Corp.. 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985), Stewart v.
Coffman. 748 P. 2d 579 (Utah App. 1988).
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Scharf

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature and History of the Case
This case centers on a contract for billboard
advertising services between the parties to this action
(hereinafter the "Advertising Agreement" ).

Pursuant to The

Advertising Agreement, the appellee Outdoor Systems, Inc.
("Outdoor Systems") contracted to provide billboard advertising
services on Interstate 19 south of Tucson, Arizona, for the
appellant, Bruce Bell & Associates, Inc. ("Bell").

There is no

dispute that the billboard actually provided by Outdoor Systems
was not visible from the highway.
refused pay for the billboard.

Bell rejected the contract and

Outdoor Systems then brought an

action on the Advertising Agreement in the Third Circuit Court,
Salt Lake County.

The matter was tried on August 7, 1990, before

Judge Edward A. Watson.

On October 3, 1990, Judge Watson entered

his Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and rendered judgment
against Bruce Bell in the amount of $10,040.24.
and Conclusions are found at Record No. 56-65.

(The Findings
Each reference

hereinafter to this pleading will be to a specific numerical
paragraph of the "Findings" or "Conclusions".

A copy of the

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law is submitted herewith as
an addendum. )

On October 17, 1990, Bell filed its Notice of

Appeal.
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Statement of Facts
The facts in this case were undisputed at trial.

The

facts relevant to the legal issues to be addressed by this Court
are as follows:
At all times pertinent to this appeal, Bell was an
advertising agency doing business in Salt Lake City, Utah.
(Finding No. 2. )

Bell was directed by one of its clients to

arrange for a billboard advertisement that would attract
travelers along Interstate 19 near Nogales, Arizona to the Kino
Springs golf course resort south of Tucson, Arizona.
No. 6. )

(Finding

The billboard was to follow a pictorial concept used in

earlier magazine advertisements done by Bell for Kino Springs.
(Finding No. 5.)

Bell contacted Outdoor Systems, an outdoor

advertising company in Arizona, regarding a new board under
construction along Interstate 19 south of Tucson.

(Findings Nos.

1, 8. )
Before the parties entered into the Advertising
Agreement, Outdoor Systems sent Bell a packet of information on
the board containing, among other things, pictures of the board
and certain dimensions.

(Finding No. 9. )

This information

indicated that the proposed billboard was a "cross reader," i. e. ,
to be read across the highway as opposed to from the same side.
It is now known that the sign was approximately 200 yards from
the point of optimal visibility in the oncoming lanes of traffic
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on Interstate 19.

(Finding No. 33. )

The data needed to make

this crucial measurement was to be found in the files of Outdoor
Systems; however, it was never disclosed to Bell.
Because of the distance and relative expense involved,
Bell did not visit the site of the board.

(Finding No. 11. )

Nonetheless, a representative of Bell7 s client with no
advertising expertise did drive by the board to verify that it
was there.

(Finding No. 12.)

Steve Brossart, ("Brossart"),

Outdoor System' s representative, was the only person with
advertising experience to actually see the board and its relation
to Interstate 19 before the advertisement was placed on it.
(Trial Transcript, pp. 45, 48.)

Brossart was fully aware that

Bell would not visit the proposed billboard and he had no reason
to believe that anyone else with expertise to evaluate the
suitability of the board would see it.

(Trial Transcript, pp.

48-49. )
On December 7, 1988, Bell and Outdoor Systems entered
into the Advertising Agreement pursuant to which Outdoor Systems
agreed to install Bell' s advertisement on the board and
thereafter to rent it to Bell at a rate of $800. 00 per month.
(Defendant' s Exhibit 3C. )

Bell then developed the advertisement

desired for the board and forwarded it to Outdoor Systems.
(Findings Nos. 15, 18. )

The advertisement included a realistic

depiction of Kino Springs with wording directing travelers to
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Kino Springs.

(Finding No. 15. )

After receiving artwork for the

proposed advertisement in mid-January, 1990, Outdoor Systems
contacted Bell and suggested that the advertisement be changed to
make the directional wording at the bottom of the ad larger and
thus more visible.

(Finding No. 20. )

Bell agreed to follow

Outdoor Systems' recommendation and the advertisement so modified
was installed on the board.

(Finding No. 21. )

Brossart admitted at trial that the location of the
billboard made it impossible for the advertisement to be read by
passers-by on Interstate 19.

(Finding No. 32. )

Soon after the

sign was placed on the billboard on February 15, 1989, Bell was
informed by its client that the sign was not visible from the
highway and that it did not approve the sign.
25. )

(Findings Nos. 22,

Bell communicated this information to Outdoor Systems

within a reasonable time after the advertisement was installed.
(Finding No. 26; Trial Transcript p. 58

[Testimony of Steve

Brossart, sales manager for Outdoor Systems]).

To cure the

billboard' s defective condition, Bell proposed that the sign be
repainted in all lettering.

(Finding No. 26. )

However, Outdoor

Systems refused to bear the cost of repainting to cure the
deficiency.

(Finding No. 28. )

Unable to obtain a satisfactory

solution, Bell rejected the Advertising Agreement in writing
within a reasonable time, according to its terms.
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(Finding No.

31 Trial Transcript p. 62 [testimony of Steve Brossart, sales
manager for Outdoor Systems]. )
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

The undisputed facts in this matter show that

Outdoor Systems provided a sign to Bell that was not visible from
the highway.

The trial court erroneously concluded that nothing

in the Advertising Agreement between the parties required Outdoor
Systems to provide a sign location which would be effective.
Effective advertising was, however, the essence of the contract
between the parties.

The trial court' s narrow interpretation is

not supported by law or fact.
2.

The trial court further erred by applying

erroneous legal standards to the issue of failure of
consideration.

The trial court incorrectly held that the

standard for failure of consideration was unconscionability and
further applied a narrow definition of the "without fault"
requirement at variance with Utah authorities.

When proper

standards are applied, the undisputed facts show that a failure
of consideration did occur.
3.

The trial court' s interpretation of paragraph 10

of the Advertising Agreement is also erroneous as a matter of
law.

The only reasonable interpretation of paragraph 10 was that

Bell had the right to reject the Advertising Agreement.
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4.

Finally, the trial court incorrectly incorporated

an assumption of risk standard as part of its analysis of the
issue of mutual mistake.

In so doing, the trial court

misconstrued the applicable legal principles.

The Advertising

Agreement was entered into on the assumption by both parties that
the sign would be visible from Interstate 19.

That assumption

was incorrect and the contract should be rescinded on grounds of
mutual mistake.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT'S FIRST CONCLUSION OF LAW DISREGARDS
THE CLEAR INTENT AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE PARTIES.
A single erroneous theme pervades the trial court' s

conclusions of law; and it is on this error, contained in
Conclusion No. 1, that the decision adverse to Bell turns.

The

trial court' s first conclusion of law states:
The Court finds that the defendant
failed to pay the contract amount based upon
its expectation that the plaintiff would
provide a sign location which would be
effective. The Court finds that there is
nothing in the contract which requires the
plaintiff to meet this expectation of
Defendant. Rather, the plaintiff s
contractual duty was to faithfully reproduce
the sign from the artwork provided to it by
defendant.
(Conclusion No. 1. )
This conclusion violates the "fundamental rule in the
interpretation of agreements that we should ascertain the prime
-8g \wp!\198\00000qgn W51

object and purpose of the parties."

4 S. Williston, The Law of

Contracts, § 619, p. 733 (3d ed. 1961).

The "prime object and

purpose" of the Advertising Agreement was to provide effective
billboard advertising space for Kino Springs golf course, i. e. ,
advertisement that could catch the attention of passing motorists
and communicate the intended message.
38,

47-48. )

(Trial Transcript, pp. 36-

Having executed a contract with such an "object and

purpose," Outdoor Systems undertook a broader range of duties
than, as the trial court concluded, just affixing artwork to a
board.

Clearly, Outdoor Systems was selling much more than that.

It was also selling the location of the billboard.

The

visibility of the billboard from that location was of central
importance.

To attract attention and convey a message, the

billboard at a minimum had to be visible from the highway.

Well

executed art work was not enough.
Before entering into the Advertising Agreement, Outdoor
Systems knew full well the location, limitations, and
measurements of the proposed board space in question.

Outdoor

Systems also knew that Bell, an out-of-state company, would not
view the board and had no direct knowledge of these particulars.
As a consequence, Outdoor Systems was on notice that Bell was
relying exclusively on the information supplied by Outdoor
Systems in making its decision to lease the board.

Yet, Outdoor

Systems neglected to provide Bell with this critical information.
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Rather, it remained silent until the Advertising Agreement was
executed.
While the trial court recognized no duty on the part of
Outdoor Systems beyond affixing the artwork to the billboard,
Outdoor Systems itself recognized a broader duty when, in midJanuary, 1989, it expressed to Bell concern as to the visibility
of the proposed sign.

These acts—although too little and too

late — clearly demonstrate that Outdoor Systems knew it was
selling more than artwork.

Further, it is without dispute that

Outdoor Systems recognized the limited visibility of the
billboard well before any artwork was in place.

The trial

court' s conclusion that Outdoor Systems' only duty under the
Advertising Agreement was to affix artwork to a billboard is
erroneous as a matter of law.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT IN ITS SECOND AND THIRD CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW ADDRESSING FAILURE OF CONSIDERATION, APPLIED
ERRQNEQUg Lgg^L gTANDARDg.
The trial court' s second and third conclusions of law

deal with failure of consideration and are erroneous as a matter
of law.
A.

Third Conclusion—" Unconscionability"

The trial court' s third conclusion of law states:
The court finds that although there may
have been unequal consideration in this
contract that the disparity in consideration
was not unconscionable and, therefore, does
not find a failure of consideration by reason

•10g \wpl\198\00000qgn W51

of unconscionability in the disparity of
consideration.
(Conclusion No. 3).
"Unconscionability" is not the legal standard by which
a failure of consideration is measured.

The correct standard for

failure of consideration, as stated in Bentlev v. Potter, 694
P. 2d 617, 619 (Utah 1984), is "wherever one who has either given
or promised to give some performance fails without his fault to
receive in some material respect the agreed exchange for that
performance."

Id. (quoting 6 S. Williston, The Law of Contracts

§ 814, at 17-78 (3d ed. 1962) (emphasis added)).

Consideration

fails, not when the disparity in exchange is "unconscionable,"
but when, as in this case, the agreed performance fails in "some
material respect".

The correct standard is materiality.

There

can be no dispute that Outdoor Systems' performance was
materially deficient and that Bell failed to receive the agreed
exchange for its performance.

The trial court' s third conclusion

is erroneous as a matter of law.
B.

Second Conclusion--"Without Fault"

The trial court' s second conclusion of law states:
The defendant has defended against
Plaintiff s claim on the basis that there was
no [sic] failure of consideration. The Court
finds that there was no such failure of
consideration because such a finding requires
a finding that the party making the claim be
without fault. The court specifically finds
and concludes that the defendant was
negligent by not viewing the sign location
-11g \wpl\198\00000qgn.W51

itself prior to the completion of the
contract.
(Conclusion No. 2. )

The court' s application of a strict

negligence standard to the failure of consideration analysis
constitutes reversible error.
The Utah Supreme Court has recently discussed failure
of consideration in Copper State Leasing Co. v. Blacker Appliance
& Furniture Co.. 770 P.2d 88, 91 (Utah 1988):
Failure of consideration (as opposed to lack
of consideration) exists ' wherever one who
has either given or promised to give some
performance fails without his fault to
receive in some material respect the agreed
exchange for that performance. ' Bentlev v.
Potter. 694 P.2d 617, 619 (Utah 1984)
(quoting 6 S. Williston, The Law of Contracts
§ 814, at 17-78 (3d ed. 1962)). If there is
a lack of consideration, there is no
contract. When consideration fails, however,
promised performance cannot be compelled.
See also Polvalycoat Corp. v. Holcomb, 591 P. 2d 449, 451 (Utah
1979) ("a failure of performance which 'defeats the very object
of the contract' or ' (is) of such prime importance that the
contract would not have been made if default in that particular
had been contemplated' is a material failure" warranting
rescission).
The trial court found only that Bruce Bell was
"negligent by not viewing the sign location itself prior to the
completion of the contract."

(Conclusion No. 2. )

This legal

conclusion reflects a misperception of both the facts and the
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law.

Bell7 s failure to view the sign before entering the

Advertising Agreement does not constitute "fault."
no contractual or common law standard of care.

Bell violated

Rather, Bell

proceeded reasonably in a manner consistent with the express and
implied representations of Outdoor Systems that the board could
effectively carry an advertising message.

Outdoor Systems was a

large, experienced outdoor advertising company with full
knowledge of the board' s limitations.

Further, Outdoor Systems

knew it was dealing with an out-of-state company that, by reason
of distance and economy, must rely on Outdoor Systems for
information and professional service.

Outdoor Systems had no

reason to believe that Bell or any agent with experience
sufficient to evaluate the suitability of the board would
actually see the board before entering into the Advertising
Agreement.

Bell did all that it could reasonably do to ascertain

the suitability of the board before entering into the Advertising
Agreement.

Conversely, before executing the Advertising

Agreement, Outdoor Systems did not advise Bell of any limitation
regarding the board.

Bell was "without fault" in entering into

this contract.
The trial court also erred in adopting an overly broad
legal construction of "without fault."

Whereas, the Utah Supreme

Court has held that a party claiming a failure of consideration
need not be completely without fault, the trial court rejected
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the failure of consideration of defense upon the slightest
showing of what it perceived to be "fault."

In Nielsen v. MFT

Leasing, 656 P. 2d 454 (Utah 1982), the plaintiff brought an
action on a computer lease agreement.

The defendant raised the

affirmative defense of failure of consideration alleging that the
computer delivered had a different serial number than the one
described in the lease.

Because the defendant had accepted

delivery of the computer, there was evidence that both parties
were "at fault" to some extent in allowing the misdelivery.
Nonetheless, the court held that failure of consideration
rendered the contract unenforceable.

££. at 456-57.

See also

Copper State Leasing Co. v. Blacker Appliance & Furniture Co. ,
770 P. 2d 88, 91-92 (Utah 1988) (construing Nielsen and pointing
out the evidence that "both parties were at fault to some
extent").
The application of the law in Nielsen and Copper State
finds support in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.

Section

157 states that fault will only bar a party7 s relief when it
amounts to "a failure to act in good faith and in accordance with
reasonable standards of fair dealing. "
Contracts § 157 (1979).

Restatement (Second) of

Comment (a) to Section 157 points out

that during negotiations "each party is held to a degree of
responsibility appropriate to the justifiable expectations of the
other."

Lfl. at § 157 comment a (1979).
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Without question, Bell met this standard of good faith
and fair dealing.

It was perfectly justifiable for Bell to rely

on a company such as Outdoor Systems to provide advertising space
that could effectively carry a message.

There is no dispute that

the billboard was materially deficient and, thus, there was a
failure of consideration.
fault.

As a matter of law, Bell acted without

The trial court erroneously concluded that Bell could not

sustain its affirmative defense of failure of consideration and
for that reason the judgment should be reversed.
III.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED THAT BELL DID NOT
HAVE THE RIGHT TO REPUDIATE THE ADVERTISING AGREEMENT.
The trial court' s fourth conclusion of law states:
The defendant has claimed that it had a
right to reject the contract and that it
exercised that right. The defendant bases
its defense upon paragraph 10 of the second
page of the contract. The Court agrees that
defendant7 s concern with regard to
readability and the effectiveness of the sign
was communicated to the plaintiff within a
reasonable time. The issue, therefore, is:
Can paragraph 10 of the contract be
reasonably interpreted to give the defendant
a right to total rejection upon
dissatisfaction with the final product? The
court finds that such a reading cannot be
given to the contract for the reason that
paragraph 10 of the contract does not go that
far and does not support Defendant' s claim of
right to rejection of the entire contract.

(Conclusion, No. 4. )
The interpretation of a contract is a matter of law and
a trial court' s interpretation of a contract provision is
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accorded no particular deference.

Morris v. Mountain States

Telephone and Telegraph Co. . 658 P. 2d 1199, 1200 (Utah 1983).
Paragraph 10 of the Advertising Agreement stated:
(Advertiser) (Agency) shall inspect the
display within
days after
installation. Unless within such period,
(Advertiser) (Agency) gives written notice to
OUTDOOR specifying any defect, the display
shall be conclusively presumed to have been
inspected and approved for all purposes
whatsoever by (Advertiser) (Agency).
The trial court specifically found that Bell met any time
limitations imposed by this paragraph.

(Conclusion No. 4.

See

also Trial Transcript p. 58 [testimony of Bruce Brossart, sales
manager for Outdoor Systems that Bell gave timely notice]).

Thus

analysis of paragraph 10 raises two issues of contract
interpretation:

First, whether the inability of the board to

advertise was a "defect," and second, whether Bell could
repudiate the Advertising Agreement when Outdoor Systems failed
to cure the defect.
The trial court, consistent with its constricted view
of Outdoor Systems' contractual duties noted at pages 8 through
10 supra, confined its definition of "defect" to the reproduction
of the display.

(See Finding No. 34. )

However, such a

definition of the term "defect" in a commercial setting is far
too narrow.

The Texas Supreme Court recently held, in the

context of an implied warranty of merchantability, that "the word
'defect' means a condition of the goods that renders them unfit
-16g.\wpl\198\00000qgn.W51

for the ordinary purposes for which they are used because of a
lack of something necessary for adequacy. "

Plas-Tex, Inc. v.

U. S. Steel Corp. , 772 S. W. 2d 442, 444 (Texas 1989) (emphasis
added).

Such a definition considers the entire purpose of the

contract and not just one aspect of the bargained for
performance.

In the present case, it is undisputed that the sign

provided by Outdoor Systems, because of its location, lacked a
trait necessary for adequacy--i. e. , visibility.

This was clearly

recognized by Outdoor Systems soon after the Advertising
Agreement was signed, but even the alteration of the graphics
urged by Outdoor Systems did not cure the defect.
Given that the billboard was defective, the sole
remaining issue is the nature of the remedy under the Advertising
Agreement.

The only reasonable interpretation of Paragraph 10 is

that, absent Outdoor System7 s cure of a defect timely noted, Bell
could repudiate the contract and refuse to pay.

After it gave

timely notice to Outdoor Systems of the defect, Bell went so far
as to propose a solution to cure the defect--re-painting the
board to all graphics.

(Finding No. 26. )

However, Outdoor

Systems wrongfully insisted that Bell bear the cost of any
repainting thereby leaving Bell with only the option of rejecting
the contract.

Bell elected this option consistent with the terms

of the Advertising Agreement.

The trial court erred in
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concluding that Outdoor Systems was not in breach of paragraph
10.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED THAT ASSUMPTION
OF RISK NEGATES A DEFENSE OF MUTUAL MISTAKE.
The trial court further erred in holding that "mutual

mistake may not be maintained if the mistake claimed was a risk
which was assumed by the parties"

and that "the risk of the

effectiveness of the sign was a risk assumed by the defendant
and, therefore, the contract is not voidable by reason of mutual
mistake. "

(Conclusion No. 9. )
The governing authorities make no mention of assumption

of risk in connection with the law of mutual mistake.

Rather,

this Court has held that "a mutual mistake occurs when both
parties, at the time of contracting, share a misconception about
a basic assumption or vital fact upon which they based their
bargain. "

Robert Langston, Ltd. v. McOuarrie, 741 P. 2d 554, 557

(Utah Ct. App. 1987) (citation omitted).

"Mutual mistake of fact

makes a contract voidable, and is a basis for equitable
recision. "

Id. (citations omitted).

The key inquiry is whether

there was a misconception, not whether some risk was assumed.
The evidence in this case, giving all reasonable doubt
to Outdoor Systems, shows that both parties to the Advertising
Agreement proceeded initially under the assumption that the
Outdoor Systems board could effectively carry an adequate
advertising message, without material limitation on the form or
-18g \wpl\198\00000qgn W51

content of the ad.
agreement.

This assumption was at the heart of the

Bell needed effective advertisement and Outdoor

Systems could not stay in business long selling space that did
not advertise.

However, in the course of performance it became

apparent that there were significant limitations to the board' s
capabilities.

This was first recognized to some degree by

Outdoor Systems in January, 1989.

Later,

once the billboard was

in place, both parties fully recognized the board' s deficiencies.
A mutual mistake of fact occurred.
The trial court erred in concluding that assumption

of

the risk negates defense of mutual mistake and that Bell assumed
the risk of the effectiveness of the sign.

The facts as found by

the trial court do not support this conclusion.

Bell did assume

the risk that the design of the advertisement might not be
effective in drawing travelers to Kino Springs.

However, that

risk was founded on the reasonable assumption that the design on
the billboard would at least be visible to travelers.

It was

not.
Once again, the trial court apportioned fault to Bell
for failing to discover the great distance of the sign from the
road.

However, as already noted, "a mistaken party's fault in

failing to know or discover the facts before making the contract
does not bar him from avoidance or reformation . . . unless his
fault amounts to a failure to act in good faith and in accordance
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with reasonable standards of fair dealing. "
of Contracts § 157 (1979).

Restatement (Second)

Bell's conduct met this standard.

No

claim can be made that Bell did not act with the utmost good
faith and within reasonable standards of fair dealing.
The mutual mistake of the parties was the assumption
that the finished billboard would be visible from Interstate 19.
Absent actual knowledge or reasonable notice, Bell could not have
assumed the risk that, as Outdoor Systems knew, the sign would be
200 yards from the point of optimal visibility.

This was not

within the reasonable range of possibilities that Bell could have
contemplated.

The trial court erred in concluding that an

advertiser assumes the risk that the advertising space offered
for lease without limitation would not physically be visible by
the very people to whom it is directed.

Such a conclusion is

erroneous as a matter of law.
CONCLUSION
The trial court in this matter entered conclusions of
law based on erroneous legal standards and at variance with its
own Findings of Facts and other undisputed facts.

Effective

advertising was the essence of the agreement of the parties.
Outdoor Systems instead provided a sign with no advertising value
to Bell.

The trial court erred in concluding that (a) this was

not a failure of consideration, (b) Bell did not have the
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contractual right to reject the contract when it learned of the
material defects in the sign provided, and (c) that a mistake of
fact did not occur.
The appellant Bruce Bell and Associates, Inc.
respectfully requests that this Court reverse the judgment of the
trial court and remand the case with directions that judgment be
entered for the appellant, awarding costs on appeal and
attorneys' fees pursuant to the Advertising Agreement and Utah
Code Ann. § 78-27-56. 5.
DATED this _^_

day of February, 1991.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY

By

/MA C

%>*^

^Brvc -t. Olson / /
Douglas C. Tingey
Attorneys for Defendant and
Appellant Bruce Bell &
Associates, Inc.
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P. O. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 532-3333
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ADDENDUM
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VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
E r i c C. O l s o n ( 4 1 0 8 )

Attorneys for Defendant
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P. 0. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 532-3333
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
OUTDOOR SYSTEMS, INC.,
Plaintiff,
vs.
BRUCE BELL & ASSOCIATES,
INC. , a Utah Corporation,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)

FINDING^ OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

)

Q^vil No. 893C06965CV

)
)

Honorable Judge Watson

J
_)

Trial of the above-referenced matter was heard before
the bench on August 7, 1990, before the Honorable Edward A.
Watson.

Paul H. Van Dyke of Elggren & Van Dyke appeared on

behalf of the Plaintiff.

Eric C. Olson of Van Cott, Bagley,

Cornwall & McCarthy appeared on behalf of the defendant.
Witnesses were sworn and evidence was taken on behalf of both
Plaintiff and Defendant.

The Court, having now considered all

the evidence and the arguments of the counsel and for good cause
therefore appearing, hereby enters it:

1.

The plaintiff is an outdoor advertising company,

in the business of providing outdoor advertising space and
preparing signs for its various clients.
2.

The defendant is an advertising firm based in

Salt Lake City.
3.

At all times relevant, both Plaintiff and

Defendant were represented in all matters relevant to this case
by individuals having substantial experience in outdoor
advertising.
4.

The defendant Bruce Bell & Associates had, prior

to the contract at issue with the Plaintiff, previously rendered
services for its client, Kino Springs.
5.

The defendant had earlier prepared a magazine

advertisement for Kino Springs and decided that a follow-up
billboard advertisement should be put in place.

The billboard

was to follow the concept of the magazine advertisement in that
is (sic) should be a pictorial and should be dignified.
6.

In late

October,

1988,

Kino

Springs

directed

the

defendant to prepare a design for and obtain a space for
displaying an outdoor sign in Arizona located on 1-19 south of
Amado.
7.

In connection with the directions from Kino

Springs, the defendant, by and through Bruce Bell, called
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Plaintiff' s representative,

Steve B r o s s a r t ,

and enquired of the

a v a i l a b i l i t y of a d v e r t i s i n g space.
8.

At t h e time of the c a l l , the p l a i n t i f f was

completing a new s i g n i n the are of i n t e r e s t t o Kino Springs.
I t was the only s i g n a v a i l a b l e in the area.
9.

Steve B r o s s a r t sent a packet of information to

the defendant as a follow-up to the c o n v e r s a t i o n which packet
was e n t e r e d i n t o evidence as Exhibits *'D-3 n ,
"D-3c" c o n s i s t i n g ,

M

D-3a", "D-3b" and

among o t h e r t h i n g s , of photographs of the

sign taken by Steve B r o s s a r t .
10.

The defendant contacted Kino Springs and

requested t h a t i t send a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e t o d r i v e by the sign
l o c a t i o n and approve i t .
11.

This was accomplished.

The defendant o r d i n a r i l y would have had one of

i t s own employees d r i v e - b y and approve the s i g n l o c a t i o n but did
not do so i n t h i s i n s t a n c e because the l o c a t i o n was out-ofstate.

The s i g n was l o c a t e d eight miles south of Green Valley,

Arizona.

According,

i t made an economic d e c i s i o n t o have i t s

c l i e n t do t h e d r i v e - b y .
12.

An employee of Kino Springs approved the sign

13.

Steve B r o s s a r t c a l l e d Bruce Bell

location.

thereafter.

shortly

Mr. Bell i n d i c a t e d t h a t the l o c a t i o n was approved
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and said that he would sign the contract earlier submitted for a
one year term.
14.
plaintiff.

The signed contract was faxed back to the

Art work for the design of the sign was to follow.
15.

Bruce Bell and the defendant created a concept

for the outdoor advertising following the concept used earlier
in a magazine advertisement, which included:
a.

A picture which was to realistically depict

Kino Springs;
Copy work necessary for the sign;
Art work prepared by an outside contractor;
and,
d.
16.

Directional language for the sign.

The above decisions made by Mr. Bell with respect

to the sign design were consciously made knowing that the sign
was to be cross-reader.
17.

The outside artist prepared a mock-up of the sign

which was intended to be proportionate to the finished sign.
18.

A copy of the artwork and mock-up for the

billboard were sent to Kino Springs by the defendant for
approval.

They were approved and later sent by the defendant to

the plaintiff for reproduction in the creation of the billboard.
19.

The artwork which was submitted by the defendant

to Plaintiff had various overlays to show color, graphics,
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p r o p o r t i o n and, in general, a l l d e t a i l t o be included in the
sign.
20.

Upon r e c e i v i n g t h e artwork,

representing the plaintiff,

Steve Brossart,

expressed concerns t o Mr. Bell

concerning the r e a d a b i l i t y of the g r a p h i c s .

In p a r t i c u l a r , Mr.

B r o s s a r t was concerned t h a t the g r a p h i c s were too small to be
read from the

iighv.-ay a::d recommended t o Mr. Bell t h a t the s i z e

of t h e g r a p h i c s be increased or t h a t ,

t o improve r e a d a b i l i t y ,

t h e sign be a l l graphic and the p i c t o r i a l be eliminated.
21.

Mr. Bell decided t o keep t h e p i c t o r i a l but agreed

with Mr. B r o s s a r t ' s recommendation t o i n c r e a s e the size of the
g r a p h i c be extending the width of the s i g n and,

thereby,

i n c r e a s e t h e s i z e of the l e t t e r s and, a t t h e same time, keep the
l e t t e r s p r o p o r t i o n a l to the p i c t o r i a l .

Mr. Bell

specifically

r e q u e s t e d t h a t the graphics and p i c t o r i a l be p r o p o r t i o n a t e .
22.

The sign was t h e r e a f t e r c o n s t r u c t e d and a

completion package was sent by P l a i n t i f f

t o the defendant.

The

a d v e r t i s e m e n t was hung on the b i l l b o a r d on February 15, 1989.
23.

The completion package d i d not i n d i c a t e how far

the s i g n was from the various lanes of highway.

That

i n f o r m a t i o n was not s p e c i f i c a l l y r e q u e s t e d by Defendant of
Plaintiff

and the information,

(sic)

though i n t h e f i l e s of P l a i n t i f f ,

was not r e a d i l y a v a i l a b l e t o Mr.

Brossart.

:,

24. The defendant, thereafter, asked as

•| representative of Kino Springs to drive by the sign for its
j, approval.
j

25. The defendant was advised by Kino Springs that

| the sign was not visible from the highway and that it did not
i| approve of the sign.
26.

Or. or about March 1, 1989, the defendant advised

, Steve Brossart of Plaintiff that the client, Kino Springs, was
n
1

not happy with the sign and asked for the possibility of having
the sign re-painted to show all graphics.

Mr. Brossart advised

that it would be acceptable if the client would bear the cost of
r e - p a m t i ng.
27.

The contract entered into between Plaintiff and

Defendant specifically indicated that in the event re-pamtir.g
was necessary, that the defendant and not the plaintiff would be
responsible for the expense of the re-painting.
(j

28. The defendant later contacted the plaintiff and

l|

'; indicated that the defendant felt t h a t the p l a i n t i f f should bear
i!

:

the cost of re-painting.
: sign at i t s own expense.

The p l a i n t i f f declined to re-paint the

ii

||

29. Cancellation of the sign was later discussed.

j; Plaintiff agreed to attempt to obtain new advertising for the
j| space but indicated that the defendant must pay for the space
I!
U until it was resold.

30.

The parties also had a discussion with respect to

relocating the sign to Kino Springs as a form of settlement.
31.

None of the settlement negotiations resulted in a

resolution of the matter and no settlement agreement was
obtained.
32.

After the sign was in place, Steve Brossart, of

Plaintiff, drove by the sign and, in his opinion, the graphics

I
were not readily seen but the pictorial could be seen.
33.

After the sign was in place, Larry Pinnock, a

representative of Defendant, drove by the sign three times and
could not see the sign on his drive-bys.

On his last drive-by,

he took a number of measurements with respect to the distance of
the sign from the highway.

Those measurements, which are

undisputed, show that the sign was approximately 200 yards from
the point of optimal visibility in the oncoming lane of traffic
on 1-19.
34.

The defendant admits that there were no defects

in the reproduction of the display, that it was prepared
pursuant to the instructions of the defendant and that the sign
was maintained for the full twelve month contract.
Additionally, the defendant was regularly invoiced for each
month of the contract.

The defendant failed and refused to make

any payment therefore.
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35.

The parties stipulated that the principal amount

unpaid under the terms of the contract is the sum of $8,323. 20,
plus interest at 1 1/2% per month on all unpaid balances.
36.

The parties reserved, pending the final decision

|
I
J
I

The contract does \
I
provide for an award of attorney's fees to the prevailing party. I
of this matter, the issue of attorney's fees.

37.

The parties stipulated that the damages claimed

would not exceed the jurisdictional limits of this Court.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now

'
!

makes and enters its :

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Court finds that the defendant failed to pay

j
;
i

the contract amount based upon its expectation that the
plaintiff would provide a sign location which would be
effective.

The Court finds that there is nothing in the

contract which requires the plaintiff to meet this expectation
of Defendant.

,

Rather, the plaintiff's contractual duty was to

faithfully reproduce the sign from the artwork provided to it by |
defendant.
2.

The defendant has defended against Plaintiff's

claim on the hasis that there was no failure of consideration.

l

The Court finds that there was no such failure of consideration
because such a finding requires a finding that the party making
the claim be without fault.

The Court specifically finds and
l

i
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I

concludes that the defendant was negligent by not viewing the
sign location itself prior to the completion of the contract.
3.

The Court finds that although there may have been

unequal consideration in this contract that the disparity in
consideration was not unconscionable and, therefore, does not
find a failure of consideration by reason of unconscionability
in the disparity of consideration.
4.

The defendant has claimed that it had a right to

reject the contract and that it exercised that right.

The

defendant bases its defense upon paragraph 10 of the second page
of the contract.

The Court agrees that defendant's concern with

regard to readability and the effectiveness of the sign was
communicated to the plaintiff within a reasonable time.
issue, therefore, is:

The

Can paragraph 10 of the contract be

reasonably interpreted to give the defendant a right to total
rejection upon dissatisfaction with the final product?

The

Court finds that such a reading cannot be given to the contract
for the reason that paragraph 10 of the contract does not go
that far and dees not support Defendant' s claim of right to
rejection of the entire contract.
5.

The defendant has defended against Plaintiff's

claim on the basis of mutual mistake.

The Court finds that

mutual mistake may not be maintained if the mistake claimed was
a risk which was assumed by the parties.
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The Court finds that

the risk of the effectiveness of the sign was a risk assumed by
the defendant and, therefore, the contract is not voidable by
reason of mutual mistake.
6.

Additionally, the Court finds that mutual mistake

is not a viable defense if the mistake concerns a prediction or
judgment.

The Court finds that the effectiveness of the sign

was a prediction or judgment made by the defendant despite the
advise by Steve Brossart that the sign should be changed to all
graphic to be readable.
7.

The Court concludes that Plaintiff is entitled to

judgment in the sum of $8,323.20 principal amounts, together
with interest on the unpaid balances at 1 1/2% per month, plus
Plaintiff's reasonable attorney's fees and costs.

The judgment

shall not, by stipulation of the parties, exceed the
jurisdictional limit of the Court.
8.

Judgment should be rendered accordingly.

DATED this _ 3

{rk'fev

day of

BY ?Xt COURT

SrabGE
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., 1990.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused Jx true and correct copy
of the within and foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to be mailed,
postage prepaid, this

f

day of February, 1991, to the

following:
Paul H. Van Dyke
ELGGREN & VAN DYKE
261 East 300 South, #175
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

^ / / C *lCyf^
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